# Contractor Ordinances Neg v Brentwood JL

## UE DA

### Contractors Link

**Living Wage For Contractors Increases Unemployment; Best Statistical Evidence. Independently Turns Income Inequality**

**Lammam, 2014:**

(The Economic Effects Of Living Wage Laws. January 2014. Charles Lammam. Analyst For The Fraser Institute)

**While** the specific definition and coverage of **living wage laws vary by** US **municipality, the ordinance is** typically **a minimum hourly wage that has to be paid to employees of private businesses that contract with the city to provide public services.** Some versions have broader coverage and also apply to employees of businesses that receive financial assistance (subsidies) from the city government. Although activists claim living wage laws can increase wages with minimal costs, the reality is quite different. **Both economic theory and evidence suggest that living wage ordinances,** like minimum wage legislation, **create distortions in the labour market that have a negative impact on employment.** When governments mandate a wage above the prevailing market rate, **a typical result is that fewer jobs and hours become available and it is usually the people who are less skilled who are most adversely affected.** Indeed, **there is a trade-off between the workers who benefit from a higher wage and those who endure the costs** due to fewer employment opportunities. **The research looking into the economic effects of living wage laws is not as developed as the minimum wage literature,** which spans several decades and over a hundred academic studies. **But the conclusion from the best and most rigorously analyzed evidence is that living wage laws have similar unintended consequences. Specifically, evidence shows that employers respond to living wages by cutting back on jobs, hours, and on-the-job training.** Those who advocate living wage laws tend to overlook these consequences and instead focus only on the benefits of such policies. **The reality is that, while some workers may benefit from a higher wage, their gain comes at the expense of others. According to research by leading scholars in the field, a 100% increase in the living wage (say going from a minimum wage of $10 per hour to a living wage of $20 per hour) reduces employment among low-wage workers by between 12% and 17%. Affected workers therefore lose valuable employment income and the ability to gain new skills and experience that foster upward income mobility.**

### Weighing

**Unemployment is worse for the poor than low wages**

**ALEC 14**

American Legislative Exchange Council. “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers.” March 2014. <http://www.alec.org/wp-content/uploads/Raising_Minimum_wage.pdf>

The problem plaguing America’s poor is not low wages, but rather a shortage of jobs.34 At a time when the nation’s workforce participation is only 62.8 percent, policymakers must avoid policies that destroy job opportunities.35 Increasing the minimum wage does nothing to help the unemployed poor. In fact, as discussed above, it hurts individuals looking for employment as it decreases available job opportunities. So, who is helped by an increase to the minimum wage? According to a 2012 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, although workers under age 25 represented only 20 percent of hourly wage earners, they made up just over half (50.6 percent) of all minimum wage earners.36 The average household income of these young minimum wage earners was $65,900.37 Among adults 25 and older earning the minimum wage, 75 percent live well above the poverty line of $22,350 for a family of four, with an average annual income of $42,500.38 This is possible because more than half of older minimum wage earners work part-time and many are not the sole earners in their households.39 In fact, 83.5 percent of employees whose wages would rise due to a minimum wage increase either live with parents or another relative, live alone, or are part of a dual-earner couple.40 Only 16.5 percent of individuals who would benefit from an increase to the minimum wage are sole earners in families with children.41 With national unemployment still hovering around 7 percent, national, state, and local demands for an increased minimum wage could not be more ill-timed.42 Increasing the minimum wage would make it more difficult for emerging businesses to expand payrolls and for existing businesses to maintain employees. Further, a higher wage rate would make it more difficult for individuals with less education and experience to find work. Raising the minimum wage favors those who already have jobs at the expense of the unemployed. Public policy would be more beneficial if it lowered barriers to entry for employment and increased economic opportunities. Raising the minimum wage may be a politically attractive policy option, but it is harmful to the very people policymakers intend it to help.

## Wage Subsidies CP (Contractors Shell)

### Text

#### Counterplan: Municipalities in the United States ought to make available for low-wage workers below the poverty level a permanent targeted wage subsidy adjusted to local cost of living and abolish minimum wage laws.

### Solvency (Ordinances)

Living wage ordinances kill job growth; wage subsidies are better, and economists agree

**EPI 1** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

It is revealing that the **living wage** activists promote policies at the local level that **would raise** the **costs of employers, rather than** targeted policies that **promote** economic **growth** and expansion. Writing in the influential Brookings Review, Edward Hill and Jeremy Nowak have made the case that distressed urban areas need a combination of tax subsidies and market-based policies that attract businesses and encourage investments in workers and infrastructure.6 **Living wage ordinances, by raising employer costs,** work in the opposite direction by **limiting job growth and employment opportunities for low-skill workers. A more appealing policy** alternative to wage mandates **is a targeted living wage subsidy that encourages the poor to work, yet does not place hiring barriers in their path. Professional labor economists**, who study the effects of wage mandates and wage subsidies, **are overwhelmingly opposed to living wage ordinances and prefer** tax credits or **wage subsidies** as antipoverty devices. This is shown in a recent survey, conducted in March and April 2000, of members of the American Economic Association who specialize in labor economics.7 Of the 336 labor economists who responded to the survey, 69 percent expressed the opinion that localized living wage ordinances were “not at all” efficient in addressing the income needs of poor families. Indeed, 43 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that a national living wage mandate would increase poverty. On the other hand, 98 percent of the responding labor economists expressed a belief that the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was either a “very efficient” (51%) or a “somewhat efficient” (47%) means of assisting the poor.

### N/B (Ordinances)

The aff destroys 50% of minimum wage contractor jobs, and that’s a conservative estimate—the CP solves

**EPI 1** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Wage Mandates Cause Job Displacement While Wage Subsidies Do Not One compelling argument against mandated wage increases on the scale advocated by the living wage movement is that they would result in job losses for the very population they seek to help. Wage mandates are thought to cause job loss by raising employers’ costs of employing low-skill labor without corresponding increases in skills or productivity. This increase in relative costs leads employers to substitute higher skilled labor and capital equipment for the very-low-wage workers the living wage movement purports to help. Without jobs, the living wage ordinances offer an empty promise. On the other hand, **targeted wage subsidies do not destroy jobs** for less-skilled workers **because they do not raise** the **employers’ costs** of employing them. The benefits are delivered to either the worker or the employer through a subsidy payment or tax credit. a. Wage Mandates Cause the Less Skilled to Lose Jobs **Based on decades of research, most labor economists agree that minimum wages do not reduce poverty** partly **because** the **costs of minimum wages are borne disproportionately by the poor.**10 When labor costs rise through wage mandates, **employers have strong incentives to substitute high**er**-skilled labor** and capital **for** the **less-skilled labor that has become more expensive**. Also, to the extent that **businesses raise prices** as a result of the wage hikes, **they stand to lose customers, which leads to further reductions in jobs**. Unfortunately, those who need the jobs the most and who have the most difficulty finding and keeping Page 3 stable work are those most likely to be hurt by the wage increases. It is thus not surprising that labor economists take a dim view of living wage ordinances because these ordinances are nothing more than the minimum wage on steroids. Based on an extensive body of respectable research, a conservative estimate would be that a mandated 10 percent increase in wages would reduce the employment and/or hours of those affected by at least 5 percent.11 Other credible studies have found much higher effects.12 This means that, **speaking conservatively, a living wage ordinance that doubled labor costs** for low-wage workers (e.g., a wage hike from $5.15 to $10.30) **could** be expected to **reduce employment of those previously working at** the **minimum wage by 50 percent**.13 That is, one out of every two affected minimum wage workers could expect to be displaced (or the equivalent in reductions in hours across the minimum wage work force) because of the higher-wages mandated by living wage ordinances. The effect for higher wage workers would also be significant. For workers whose wages were raised by 50 percent, say from $7.00 to $10.50, one of four of them is likely to be displaced (or we would see an equivalent hours reduction for the work force). This is just the shortrun effect. The longer-term effects are less well documented, but are likely to lead to further skilled labor or capital substitution, or other adjustments that reduce labor demand. The disemployment effects could be lower for contractor-based mandates if the local government absorbs a high fraction of the higher wage and benefit costs. Is it any wonder that labor economists generally regard wage mandates as being more likely to increase poverty than to reduce it?

The aff’s poorly targeted; the CP solves

**EPI 1** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

Compared with the question of whether wage mandates cause employment losses, there is even a greater degree of consensus among labor economists that wage mandates are ineffective in reducing poverty.32 **It is undisputed that many** of the **wage increases that result from minimum wage hikes go not to the needy, but** to **those in the middle or upper part of** the **income distribution**.33 Many of those who benefited are young people who live with their parents, are not the sole support of a family, or reside in households with above-average family incomes.34 Moreover, because **many poor families do not have** any **full-time workers**, they do not benefit, **or** they **benefit only marginally**, from the mandated wage increases.35 Also, as mentioned above, since wage mandates are thought to cause employment displacement among those who have limited skills and work experience, the poor end up paying disproportionately for any benefits they may receive. Because living wage ordinances are relatively new, we know less about the distribution of benefits from living wage ordinances than we do about those from minimum wage hikes. However, it is known that **in the U**nited **S**tates**, poverty is generally associated with either no work or part-time work**.36 **Mandated wage policies are limited** in their capability to raise families out of poverty because they benefit mostly those who work full-time and who are thus less likely to be poor. Wage mandates are considered inefficient because many of their benefits go to the non-poor, and because not all poor families receive benefits. The inefficiency is exacerbated by the job displacement effects that fall chiefly on the less skilled. **On the other hand, targeted wage subsidies by design are limited to workers in low-income families**, or to firms that employ such workers. Moreover, the targeted wage subsidies encourage the poor to increase their labor force participation without causing job losses. Thus, the truly needy are able to receive greater net benefits. Targeted wage subsidies are thus more efficient in helping families in need than untargeted wage mandates.

Taxes and benefit reductions offset aff solvency; the CP avoids this

**EPI 1** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

Unlike Living Wage Ordinances, Wage Subsidies Do Not Cause Poor Families to Lose Government Benefits For poor families receiving government assistance, there is yet another reason mandated wage policies are ineffective in alleviating their poverty. **Government assistance programs such as T**emporary **A**ssistance for **N**eedy **F**amilies**, food stamps,** the **E**arned **I**ncome **T**ax **C**redit **and housing assistance** all **reduce their benefits incrementally** as a family’s earnings increase. A recent study from New York University Law School has documented just how pervasive such work disincentives can be for workers in poor families.37 This means that for every additional dollar a family earns it could lose as much as 90 cents or more in federal benefits. **Thus,** the **upside potential for a living wage mandate to** substantially **increase a poverty family’s net income is** extremely **limited**. Indeed, **even advocates** of living wage mandates **concede that a significant part** of any mandated wage increase **is lost through taxes and benefit losses**. For example, Pollin and his colleagues estimated that in the absence of job losses, a New Orleans minimum wage of $6.15 would increase the gross earnings of affected workers by 12 percent, but would increase their after-tax, after-benefit incomes by only 2.9 to 4.4 percent.38 In contrast **targeted wage subsidies do not impinge on a family’s eligibility for government programs, and thus cause no loss of benefits**.39 In view of these facts, most labor economists view wage mandates as inefficient and likely to cause more harm than good. They prefer wage subsidies that can be more efficiently targeted to those in need and that do not cause the loss of jobs.

## Pettit NC

### Framework

**The standard is non-domination, defined as minimizing the capacity for arbitrary interference.**

**Only civic republicanism can ground state coercion – this straight turns his actor specificity warrants.**

**Waltman 2**

Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program.  He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law.  He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics.  In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

Civic republicanism's origins lie in the ancient world, in the political theory undergirding several notable Greek city-states and the Roman republic. (2) Thereafter, it lay dormant until resurrected in the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, and then by the "Commonwealth men" of seventeenth century England. From the latter, it was transported to the American colonies and flowered during the Revolutionary era and immediately afterward. While republican thinkers from these various periods parted company on several matters, their unifying focus was that the polity is a self-governing community of citizens. The aim of the civic republican polity is maintaining the liberty of its citizens. Since liberty cannot be achieved outside a community-a wild animal can be "free" but it cannot be said to have "liberty"-the individual citizen must be intimately connected to the community. He must believe that his **[their] interests are inseparable from** those of **the community**, and that the role of citizen is a natural part of life. The state can rely on its citizens, who after all are the state, to exercise civic virtue and to consider the needs of the community along with their own. The citizenry governs itself by the process of deliberation, a deliberation devoted to finding and pursuing the public interest. To this end, political institutions in a republic should evidence a certain balance and be rather slow acting, at least under ordinary circumstances. Representative democracy, which allows republics to be larger than city-states, is a method for the further protection of liberty. It is not, pointedly, an end in itself. Unlike liberal individualism, which posits no overriding end for the polity, civic republicanism stands emphatically on liberty as its central value. Liberty is taken to mean being free from domination. More formally, according to Richard Petit, a leading contemporary republican theorist, "One agent dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a power of interference on an arbitrary basis." (3) Domination can therefore take either of two forms. In the first, one private individual holds power over another (dominium); in the second, it is the state which exercises the domination (imperium). Both are equally odious to republicanism. If I am dominated, I am not free, no matter what the source of the domination. To be a citizen is to be at all times and all places free of domination, since citizenship is synonymous with the enjoyment of liberty. Prohibiting dominium presupposes that no citizen can be the servant of another, for servanthood brings domination with it by its very nature. If you are my servant and I order you around, you are quite clearly being dominated. Nevertheless, it is important to note that **you are dominated even if I chose not to order you around** (for whatever reason). You still cannot look me in the eye as an equal, for we both know that "The Remains of the Day" is more realistic than Wooster and Jeeves. Not only may I alter my reserved role at any time without consulting you, but you will also be ever mindful of my ability to do so, and that cannot help but affect how you think, feel, and act. You and I are both aware that there may come a time when you will have to tread gingerly. Citizens of a republic simply cannot have such a relationship. As Petit said of civic republicans: The heights that they identified held out the prospect of a way of life within which none of them had to bow and scrape to others; they would each be capable of standing on their own two feet; they would each be able to look others squarely in the eye. (4) Or, as Walt Whitman succinctly described a citizen, "Neither a servant nor a master am I." (5) Governmental power can of course be a source of domination also, for the enormous power of the state is ever pregnant with the potential for domination. **There is, however, a critical difference** here. Whereas interference, real or potential, by one individual over another's choices is by its nature domination, governmental interference in one's affairs may or may not be. This is because liberty can only be made meaningful in a community, and the needs of the community will necessarily at times come into conflict with one or more individuals' autonomy, or at least with individuals' autonomy as they would define it. It is the community that makes liberty possible, and a citizen's freedom is inseparable from the interests and health of the community. As Blackstone noted, "**laws, when prudently framed, are** by no means subversive but rather **introductive of liberty**." (6)

### Contention

**I contend living wage is unfair – it overburdens employers. The counterplan solves.**

**Mankiw 14**

N. Gregory Mankiw (Chairman and Professor of Economics at Harvard University). “Help the Working Poor, but Share the Burden.” New York Times. 4 January 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/business/help-the-working-poor-but-share-the-burden.html?\_r=0

As a result, those who are worried about inequality look for more immediate ways to help workers with limited skills. Before turning to President Obama’s proposal, let’s consider two other possibilities. For lack of better terms, call them Plan A and Plan B: PLAN A **The government subsidizes** the incomes of **low-wage workers.** These subsidies are financed by increasing taxes on middle- and upper-income Americans. PLAN B The government again subsidizes the incomes of low-wage workers. But under this plan, the subsidies are financed by taxing those companies that hire low-wage workers. Stop reading for a moment and consider: Which of these plans would you prefer, and why? If you have a pen or pencil handy, jot down your reasons. O.K. — and now, here are my answers: To me, Plan A is distinctly better than Plan B, which suffers from two problems — one involving fairness, and one involving efficacy. First, fairness: If we decide as a nation that we want to augment the income of low-wage workers, it seems only right that we all share that responsibility. Plan A does that. By contrast, Plan B concentrates the cost of the wage subsidy on a small subset of businesses and their customers. There is no good reason this group has a special obligation to help those in need. Indeed, one might argue that this group is **already doing more than its share**. After all, it is providing jobs to the unskilled. Asking it to do even more, while letting everyone else off the hook, seems particularly churlish. But even putting fairness aside, there is reason to doubt the efficacy of Plan B. Taxing businesses that hire unskilled workers would alter their behavior in ways that would hurt those we are trying to help. To avoid the tax, businesses would have an incentive to hire fewer of these workers. For example, they would have greater incentive to replace workers with labor-saving machines. In addition, some of the tax would be passed on to customers in the form of higher prices. These customers, in turn, would have an incentive to spend more of their income elsewhere. Over time, these businesses would shrink, reducing the job opportunities for the unskilled. All in all, the Plan B tax-and-subsidy plan sounds like a pretty bad idea. Why, you might wonder, did I bring it up? Because it is the one favored by President Obama. He calls it an increase in the minimum wage. To be sure, the minimum wage isn’t exactly a system of taxes and subsidies. But its effects are much the same as those of Plan B. Unskilled workers earn more, and the businesses that hire them pay more. The main difference between the minimum wage and Plan B is that, under a minimum wage, the extra compensation is paid directly from the business to the worker, rather than indirectly via the government. When proposing to increase the minimum wage, President Obama said that “there’s no solid evidence that a higher minimum wage costs jobs.” In fact, many studies suggest that it does precisely that. Mr. Obama is like a physician who prescribes a medicine based on a few studies that find no side effects while ignoring others that report debilitating effects.

## Outsourcing Good DA

### Contractors Link

**Unions spurred by living wage reverse the trend of outsourcing.**

**Harvard 1**

Harvard (university in Boston; notable Harvard attendees include Barack Obama, J Robert Oppenheimer, and Jacob Pritt). Living Wage Memo. 2001. http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/pslm/livingwage/memo1.html

A living wage that binds for all workers at Harvard-whether directly employed by the university or by its subcontractors-would have a lasting impact on labor relations on this campus. Specifically, it would increase job stability for both people who would be directly impacted by the policy, as well as those currently earning more than ten dollars an hour. Such outcomes are due to the effect that a living wage policy would have on the practice of outsourcing. In recent years, corporate restructuring across America has taken advantage of weakened power of workers and unions to facilitate outsourcing of jobs to outside contractors. Often, these jobs are part-time, temporary, provide no benefits, and effectively bar employees from having any voice at the workplace. Harvard is no exception to the logic of cost cutting at the expense of the livelihoods of working Americans. Taking advantage of legal and institutional loopholes, on many occasions this university has engaged in such "corporate shielding." A simple example illustrates the incentives to employers for outsourcing. If organized Harvard employees feel that Harvard is unfairly denying them a raise, they have the recourse to strike. Of course, Harvard could get away with hiring strikebreakers, but this does impose additional costs. Yet, if those same employees working at Harvard were officially employed by a subcontractor, Harvard could switch to another outside contractor without incurring any additional costs. Intermediating through an outside contractor effectively bars the employees from exercising their rights at the workplace. By funneling jobs to the sectors where workers are least able to voice their demands, Harvard can bypass the legal and institutional safeguards which are in place to protect employees.

### Systemic Impact

Outsourcing helps other countries develop, improving their labor and environmental standards

**Cowen 4** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

You and I approach trade issues very differently. Most importantly, you take a nationalist perspective. I believe that as economists we should take a broader, cosmopolitan perspective. Many Indians and other recipients of outsourcing investment are desperately poor by U.S. standards. It is both proper and in our long-term national interest to help India develop into a free and prosperous economy. Indians do not count for less simply because they stand outside of U.S. national borders. **To assert that poor**er **countries "take advantage of us" is to** beg the question and **deny** the **benefits of free trade**, which are commonly accepted by virtually all economists. Even the left-wing Paul Krugman remains a free-trade advocate. **Poor countries should not have** the same **environmental and labor standards that the U.S. does; they** simply **cannot afford them and do not have** the **requisite legal structures** to enforce them. **The best way to improve their standards is** to **help them grow rich, so outsourcing is part of the solution** in this regard. And outsourcing no more destroys American jobs than does technical progress. If we look at current unemployment, outsourcing has not been a major source of the problem. I'm all for improving the lot of the current unemployed. This is best done by private-sector training, including for-profit education. Our rather bureaucratic government has no comparative advantage in retraining displaced labor. And do you really expect the Republicans to allocate these funds according to economic merit, rather than future electoral advantage? Cutting the government deficit would restore long-run economic confidence. A broader safety net is important for humane reasons, but remember that it often hinders long-run economic adjustments rather than helping them. Welfare and unemployment insurance often lower the incentive to find a new job, relocate or retrain. We should not think of the safety net as the solution to an unemployment problem; rather it is a (necessary) exacerbation of that problem. I view the trade deficit as the symptom of our low savings rate rather than an issue per se. Furthermore, it is inconsistent to complain about outsourcing and the trade deficit at the same time. If we ran a trade surplus we would, as an accounting identity, have to export more capital. This would mean more outsourcing. And if the Chinese wish to subsidize American purchases by keeping their currency artificially low, we should be happy to buy at discount prices.

### Productivity Turn

Outsourcing’s key to productivity

**Cowen 4** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

**Outsourcing helps us move to** higher paying and **more productive jobs**. For instance, **Asian producers were dominating the memory-chip market by the late** 19**80s**. Despite vociferous complaints, this hardly spelt disaster for U.S. high-tech endeavors. **Cheaper chips** and other components **allowed America**n semiconductor makers **to switch to higher-value microprocessors. The result**ing information-technology boom **has boosted** American **productivity growth**. Cheaper software or phone-answering services will bring similar results, albeit not immediately in every case. Insourcing, as traditionally defined, accounts for more than 6.5 million jobs nationwide. U.S. companies operate about 10 million positions abroad, but the balance of insourcing vs. outsourcing has been moving in our favor. In the critical area of business services, the U.S. regularly runs a multibillion-dollar trade surplus. Critics expect American wages to fall toward world levels as outsourcing grows. Most likely, even extreme outsourcing will boost long-run real wages. **Outsourcing resembles technical progress** in its economics; in both cases, we procure something more cheaply, whether it is produced by machine or by Indians. We have had dramatic technical progress now for several hundred years. While particular groups take short-run losses, real wages have risen across the board. It is because we shed low-productivity jobs that we move to a wealthier and more-productive set of options. The core intuition of the critics is that U.S. "unskilled labor" will someday earn or approach the real wages of India or China. But American workers at many different skill levels are uniquely situated -- in terms of economic, legal and social contexts -- to be mobilized into new and growing sectors. An uneducated American worker is not close to the same as an uneducated Indian worker in this regard. Everyone has some skills, and American entrepreneurs constantly find ways to make a given set of skills count for the most, often relying on productive interactions. In other words, the value of skills is determined by a region's core general capital structure. Indian outsourcing firms, in contrast, usually build self-sufficient economic islands, many of which have to produce their own infrastructure. These ventures face strong natural limits.

# Case Answers

## AT Jackson’s R6 Framework

**AT: Kennan**

1. Kennan has no warrant.

2. Prefer Waltman; he cites the constitutive role of the state.

3. Empirics prove freedom-preserving states are more effective. It ensures checks and balances which are a key safeguard on totalitarianism.

**AT: Conflicting Side Constraints**

1. My framework solves; it’s not an absolute constraint. Pettit frames autonomy as a sliding scale.

2. No link to non-domination; it’s a state-specific and relational account of freedom, which means it accounts for values conflicts.

3. TURN – util fails because there are infinite possible consequences to account for in any values conflict.

4. TURN – util fails because happiness is unverifiable, so it would be impossible to know whether one person in the values conflict is a utility monster.

**AT: Intentions**

No link to the intentions argument; my framework is derived from Pettit, who’s a consequentialist. My contention is about the distribution of burdens, not the intention.

## Pre-empts

### AT: No Neg RVIs

Neg gets RVIs if I don’t run theory. Key to reciprocity. Also key to deter the 1AR from using blippy theory to minimize topic engagement. If the 1AR was too skewed to win substance, she should collapse to 4 minutes of theory anyway.

They say chilling effect,

1. No uniqueness – theory is over-used now. Try or die for the neg.

2. Turn – chilling good. Theory’s uneducational and makes me sad. Outweighs on **magnitude** because it’s literally destroying topic debate.

3. TURN – I outweigh on **probability**. Over-chilling is empirically denied by the last 3 years of RVI debates.

4. TURN – I have a **stronger link**. Theory is totally no risk but RVIs aren’t because the neg can always win theory against abusive NCs to moot the RVI.

### AT: Presumption

Don’t vote on presumption or permissibility because human fallibility means there’s always a nonzero risk of offense.

### AT: Competing Interps

Gutcheck against dumb theory.

Competing interps kills accessibility. **Imas 12** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

By its very nature, **theory** debate **is** one of the most **arcane** parts of debate. What other competitive activity sees participants spend half of their competition trying to figure out what the rules are for the game in the first place? Very few people (if any), at least on the national circuit, would say that theory has no role in LD debate, **but competing interp[s]**retations, however, **takes theory** debate **to a whole new level. First,** it has mounted a significant following of those who believe that no counter-interpretation means you auto-lose. I think that this kind of requirement, even under competing interpretations, is somewhat meaningless, as long as the judge simply assumes that a lack of an explicit interpretation means you just assume the debater is advocating a rule that is the opposite of the original interpretation. Regardless, holding debaters to **this** kind of **standard requires** knowledge of theory that extends not only to **figuring out how to craft an interp**retation**/counter-interp**retation, but also to crafting one that is strategic so that you don’t lose for something you didn’t do. This is **compounded by the fact that LD has no set of resources** that debaters can use **to learn about** the intricacies of **theory** debate without attending camp or hiring a coach. This obviously isn’t a unique problem with theory, but I believe that competing interpretations severely exacerbates this problem, as other obscure parts of debate i.e. meta-ethics can be read about and other LD-related concepts can be learned from some of the NFL Online videos. **Second, it** holds debaters to standards that **make[s] it impossible to answer abuse claims without knowing what** kind of **arguments the judge will** actually **care about. A typical person’s response** to someone claiming that they acted unfairly would be to dismiss that claim by arguing that they didn’t hurt them in any way. Under competing interpretations, this **is insufficient because a “risk of offense”** on the theory debate **means** that **they** would **lose anyway**s and any contrived claim is enough because “it’s not what you do, it’s what you justify.” **This further drives theory** debate **in a hopelessly inaccessible direction.**

### General

The neg gets to answer spikes in the 2NR.

**Some schmuck 4-21** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

Here I will give a number of reasons to think that **it is unreasonable to expect the negative to answer spikes before they are applied in the 1AR**. I recognize that the common assumption is that one may respond to the application of spikes e.g. the ‘violation’ but it is my position that one should actually be able to respond to any part of the argument. First, **you can only assess an argument** by **knowing the way it is used. Because different uses of the same premise**, will give the argument more or less credence. If I have a set of premises that entail a conclusion, those premises may cause me to accept the conclusion. However, I could also, given how much I doubt the conclusion give up on the premises. Thus for instance, if I started with the premise ‘I am not dreaming right now’ (which I do not think I am) that would lead me to think ‘I really am on a bus going to the airport.’ However, if that premise lead me to think ‘that really is my prize watermelon yodeling over the Swiss Alps, I would instead have reason to rethink my premise (perhaps I am dreaming after all). (Incidentally this is one of several reasons why the idea of a ‘skep trigger’ does not make sense. Just because my premise was strong enough to be part of an argument that your moral theory is false, does not mean it is strong enough to be part of an argument that no moral theory is true). . Now, **before someone applies a spike, the strength of the conclusion is not there**. Will the RVI apply to I-meets or only counter interpretations? Will the 1AR do something abusive that I will want to read theory against? Does prefer aff offense mean ‘always prefer’ or just ‘give it some higher credence’? Will no Neg RVIs suddenly apply to even if they read 3 new shells in the 1AR? **The spike may seem** reasonable in the context of the AC, but **unreasonable in the context of the 1AR**. A good example is a round I saw this last weekend. The affirmative read a spike that basically said the negative can only have one layer of offense (like only substance or only theory). The negative missed it and read theory and an NC. The aff extends it, but then also goes heavily for ‘reasonability’ against the negative theory. Now, by the ‘reasonability threshold’ the 1AR read it was clear that the spike was ‘unreasonable.’ I feel we should all agree that the negative should be allowed to argue that in the context of reasonability in the 1AR the spike should not be applied, however it strikes me that if all spikes are first ‘applied’ in the 1AR and thus the context of the 1AR should be provided to answer the argument. Therefore, given that one cannot assess the ‘conclusion’ of the spike, because the conclusion assumes the context of the 1AR, there it is unreasonable to expect the negative to try to answer the argument.

Spikes are esoteric, so the neg should get to contest them once they’re complete args. Prefer my evidence; it has a Wittgenstein quote

**MT 4-21** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

A second reason to think this is the **specialized vocabulary** that **has grown up around debate terms. What** exactly **does it mean to ‘prefer,’** what is ‘comply or conflict,’ **what** exactly **is entailed by ‘competing interp**retation**s,’** what does it mean for X to be a ‘voter,’ **what are the conditions of ‘fairness’**. I assume that no one thinks that fairness or education are monolithic concepts, thus I might agree with you that the argument is ‘educational’ in the way you use the word education, but not in the sort of education debate should value. **Until the entire argument is out there and put to use, there is no framework of verification for what those words mean.** Debaters from different regions, camps and contexts will interpret different spikes differently and thus we should wait to verify how it used before being expected to answer it. Once when expressing this opinion, it was responded that debaters should just make the argument that the implication was unclear and they can have that debate in round. The problem is, that debate starts too late. The negative does not get a chance to contest the application of the spike till the 2nr, and any judge will tell you it is basically impossible to assess a debate that start in the 2nr, the judge will almost always just end up siding with which opinion they think is right (which will again stem from their region, school, camps etc.). **No article would be complete without a** dubiously applied, decontextualized **aphorism of Wittgenstein’s** so I will end this argument with **“For a large class of cases of** the employment of **the word ‘meaning’**—though not for all—this way can be explained in this way**: the meaning of a word is its use in the language”** (PI 43, emphasis added).

Aff has side bias.

(a) Living wage lit is insanely aff biased, which is especially true for contractors.

(b) Aff speaks first and last and has infinite prep time.

## Contention

### Poverty (Consensus)

**Living wage ordinances cause poverty; consensus of economists**

**Quigley 1**

William Quigley, Law Professor-Loyola University New Orleans, 2001, "Full Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living Wage Movement," Mississippi Law Journal, Spring, 70 Miss. J.J. 889, p. 935-6

Opponents of living wages argue that these ordinances could potentially increase the local poverty rate and cost too much. A survey of over 300 economists conducted in 2000 for the Employment Policies Institute, a nonprofit research organization generally opposed to raises in both the minimum wage and the enactment of living wage ordinances, found that nearly eight in ten of the labor economists surveyed thought living wage ordinances would result in employers hiring higher skilled workers, and over 70% said the laws could potentially reduce the number of entry-level jobs and thus increase the local poverty rate. [n180](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n180) The opposition also suggests that living wage ordinances increase the cost of governmental contracts. Pasadena, California, estimated their living wage ordinance cost to be about $ 200,000 for the year 2000; Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated its cost at $ 300,000; Madison, Wisconsin, estimated its cost at $ 47,000. [n181](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n181) While there is certainly some cost associated with living wages, this article will not join in the aforementioned melee of economists. Others disagree. [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n182)

### Compliance

Monitoring compliance with living wage ordinances is difficult. Baltimore proves.

**Niedt et al 99** write[[10]](#footnote-10)

**Since the ordinance was** first **implemented, there have been several reports of** ongoing **violations**. Also, **there has been** some **ambiguity concerning when contractors must pay the living wage**, especially contractors with long contracts or options for extension. Whatever the cause of noncompliance, the result would be to reduce the upward pressure on costs to the city. A significant example concerns the bus contracts that make up such a large proportion of the contracts on which we were able to develop comparable data. **The majority of bus companies were not in compliance** during the first half of FY 1997 **due to** a **dispute over** the nature of bus **contract extensions**. At this point, wages were scheduled to rise to $6.60 an hour, but most companies continued paying at the FY 1996 rate of $6.10 an hour. Other bus companies were found to be in noncompliance since January 1997 (i.e., the second half of FY 1997). Compliance, in principle, is enforced by **the city Wage Commission**, which **must sift through payroll data on every worker. Because of** the **voluminous data and the small staff**, the commission has so far been able to monitor only bus contracts. But, as shown below, this **monitoring has not guaranteed compliance.**

### Turnover

Low turnover harms low-skilled workers, and their evidence doesn’t deny labor substitution effects

**EPI 1** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Second, although **the turnover argument** has logical appeal and has some support in empirical research, it **misses an important dimension of** how **low-skill labor markets** operate. **One of the consequences of** a **lower** rate of voluntary **turnover is that employers post fewer job vacancies because there is less need to replace workers who quit. This** drop in job vacancies once again **hurts** most severely **the low-skilled, who** are known to **have limited labor force attachments** and who will suffer from the fewer job openings.17 Also, notwithstanding any cost savings realized from lower turnover, firms still have incentives to substitute capital and higher-skilled workers for low-skilled workers because the cost of low-skilled labor has been forced up.18

## Evidence Indicts

### AT Clain

**Can’t Solve Poverty; Clain’s Conclusion**

**Clain, 2007:**

How Living Wage Legislation Affects U.S. Poverty Rates Suzanne Heller Clain J Labor Res (2008) 29:205–218 DOI 10.1007/s12122-007-9028-8 Published online: 17 July 2007 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Note that **living wage legislation cannot be touted as an automatic cure-all in the struggle to eradicate poverty in any case. The magnitude of its effect is not large. Moreover, without the commitment of the local governments to the task of absorbing its cost, living wage legislation could easily go the way of the minimum wage.**

**AT Lester/ Jacobs**

**Lester and Jacobs Focus On Labor Standards; They Don’t Control For Living Wage**

**Lester and Jacobs, 2010:**

Creating Good Jobs in Our Communities How Higher Wage Standards Affect Economic Development and Employment - Lester and Jacobs November 2010 <https://www.americanprogressaction.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/11/pdf/living_wage.pdf>

**Cities across the country are working to gain greater control over these projects and help create quality jobs by attaching wage standards to their economic development subsidies.** Communities **are linking labor standards to public development projects** in various ways, **including community benefits agreements and prevailing wage laws. But the most common and comprehensive policies are business assistance living wage laws, which require businesses receiving public subsidies to pay workers wages above the poverty level.** These economic development wage standards have successfully raised pay for covered workers. Yet opponents of these standards argue that such laws prevent businesses from creating jobs and thus help some workers at the expense of employing more workers. Some business leaders and developers also claim that adding labor standards to economic development projects will scare away potential investors by sending an “antibusiness” signal. **This report examines these** claims **and finds that economic development wage standards** have no negative effect on citywide employment levels. This casts serious doubt on arguments that standards dampen municipalities’ ability to use subsidies to attract new businesses or create negative business climates where all firms avoid investment.

**AT: Page**

**Living Wage Isn’t Key, And The CP Solves; Their Author**

**Page, 2014:**

Are Jobs the Solution to Poverty? by Marianne Page Pathways Summer 2014 https://web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/\_media/pdf/pathways/summer\_2014/Pathways\_Summer\_2014\_Page.pdf

**An antipoverty policy** that focuses on jobs and employment **will need to be targeted to the current employment regime** if it is to have any payoff. A simple policy of “more jobs” has become a less viable poverty solution, but there may be a package of more targeted policies that, taken together, could have substantial poverty-reducing effects. **The first, and especially important, part of this package is to promote wage growth within the low-skill sector. This might be done by increasing the minimum wage, further increasing the EITC, or through other interventions in the labor market such as skill-enhancing training programs.** The second part of this package is a strong unemployment insurance (UI) system, which plays a critical role in reducing poverty associated with recessions because it provides temporary partial-wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers, many of whom have incomes near the poverty line. Indeed, because the rate at which UI replaces earnings varies (negatively) with earnings, UI provides relatively greater protection to low-wage workers. In most states and years, UI benefits can be received for a maximum of 26 weeks, but during the most recent recession Congress enacted emergency extensions that increased benefits in most states to 99 weeks. These UI benefits make it possible for families to maintain their prior levels of food consumption (an important determinant of well-being) in the aftermath of a job loss.

**AT CRA**

**CRA Is About The New York Model, Which He Doesn’t Defend**

**CRA, 2011:**

The Economic Impacts on New York City of the Proposed Living Wage Mandate Prepared By: Charles River Associates: Matthew Thompson Marsha Courchane Copyright 2011 Charles River Associates

**One important component of this research is the specific living wage mandate proposed for New York City.** In particular**, the draft legislation informs the determination of the parameters under which the simulations are conducted, and this affects the measurement of the impacts on city residents and real estate development investment. The analyses here were developed based on Int. No. 251-2010, a proposed administrative code amendment to local law. In the NYC-specific proposal, the mandate includes coverage for recipients of “financial assistance.” In other studies and other cities this is usually referred to as a “business assistance living wage” mandate.**

## 2NR

### CP

**Permutation Fails; Only The CP Alone Avoids Increasing Labor Costs. The Impact Is Unemployment, Discrimination, And Income Inequality**

**Harris, 2014:**

(Raise The Minimum Wage? No Subsidize Wage Instead. February 21, 2014. Larry Harris, Fred V. Keenan Chair In Finance At The USC Marshall School of Business. Chief Economist Of The SEC From 2002 To 2004)

Common sense supports this. The strongest principle of economics — **demand theory** — **maintains** that **people buy less when an item is costly and more when it is cheap. That means employers will buy less labor when wages are high and they'll offer more employment when labor is less costly to them. The Congressional Budget Office report** released Tuesday supports this view. Its nonpartisan analysts **predict that the proposed increase in the minimum wage to $10.10 an hour would cost the economy 500,000 jobs**. It's true that while some studies show the negative effect of raising the minimum wage, others show that has little or no downward impact on employment. Such contradictory results are due to the complexity of factors regarding employment. For example, employers rarely cut jobs immediately after a minimum-wage increase. They often wait for natural attrition to lower their head counts, or they may refrain from replacing employees when they know an increase is coming. But the absence of definitive evidence does not indicate that demand theory doesn't apply to increasing the minimum wage. It merely indicates that the effect is hard to measure. **Loss of jobs — overall and over time — isn't the only negative effect of mandating an increase in the minimum wage. When employers must pay above-market wages, the ratio of job seekers to available jobs rises, and that allows employers to pick and choose. With more workers to pick from, employers can more easily get away with basing their hiring decisions on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disabilities or age. They also are more likely to practice legal forms of discrimination: When faced with many job candidates, employers tend to hire the most experienced workers. That** means those just starting out remain unemployed. **Worse, they lose the opportunity to build the work experience needed to obtain better jobs.** **Proponents of mandating higher minimum wages believe that higher wages can help level the lopsided income distribution in America.** Obviously, it would raise the incomes of minimum-wage employees. But to some extent this benefit **would be offset as other workers lose their jobs or work fewer hours. The increased labor costs that companies would pass on to consumers in the form of high product prices also would offset raised incomes. And some minimum-wage employers, whose customers can't afford to pay higher prices, would fail, again offsetting gains with lost jobs. What's a better way? Do away with minimum wages altogether and institute wage subsidies.** The government should give vouchers to unemployed workers seeking low-income jobs. Those vouchers would provide wage subsidies to employers who hire them. The subsidies would be based on the wages that the employers offer, with the greatest subsidies going to the lowest-wage jobs. **The subsidies would lower labor costs, thereby increasing the number of jobs employers offer to low-income workers.** Wages earned overall by the poor would increase, more young people would get jobs and gain valuable work experience, fewer people would be on the streets, fragile businesses could thrive and new companies would start up. **More jobs also would reduce welfare grants and increase payroll taxes, which could help fund the subsidies. Everyone would be better off as the subsidies lowered product prices and increased production.** To some extent, the government already has a wage subsidy plan; it's called the earned income tax credit. It lowers the income taxes of low-income workers. For those who make so little that they don't owe income tax, the credit provides income subsidies**. An increase in this credit also would flatten the income distribution. But the earned income tax credit does not help those who are unemployed. Wage vouchers are a better policy than the earned income tax credit because they immediately and obviously lower the cost of employing workers, so the number of jobs increases and the unemployment rate drops. L**egislating an increase in the minimum wage is the quintessential example of an unfunded government mandate. It's identical to a simultaneous tax and income transfer program. It unwisely taxes employers who create jobs, and it unfairly subsidizes only low-income workers who have jobs. **Subsidizing wages would be much better for the economy than raising the minimum wage.**

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